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THE WORLD SUMMIT ON THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: 
MAKING THE CASE FOR PRIVATE INDUSTRY FILTERING 
TO CONTROL EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND 
TRANSNATIONAL INTERNET CENSORSHIP CONFLICTS 
I. I NTRODLICTION 
Creators of internet content and corporations that utilize internet portals 
internationally should be aware of two issues that will come before the World 
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) this November. The first issue is 
unlawful content and the second is access protection. This note explores the 
manner in which various countries plan on handling these issues. I The conclu-
sions reached at the WSIS may affect what is accessible on the Internet, and if 
content creators will be liable for violating foreign laws in various jurisdictions 
simply for publishing certain materials on the Internet. 
This paper specifically addresses foreign assertion of jurisdiction over 
Internet content creators and proposes means to avoid the chilling effect foreign 
assertion of jurisdiction inevitably has on speech and Internet based commerce. 
Part II of this paper provides a brief background on both the wsrs and the 
Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), and outlines the problems 
I See Working Group on Inlerne! Govcrnance. IsslIe Pal'er Oil [illiallflli COlllell1 alld Access 
I'rolccli(}//. amilahl!! al http://wgig.org/docsiWP-LJnlawfuIConlcnl.pdf(last visited Mar. 19. 20()S). '''Unlawful 
content' retCrs to contcnt thai is deemcd illegal. That is, Ihe origination, production, and somelimes even 
consumplion, oCthe content can resull in prosecution and conviction in a court of law. 'Access protection' refers 
to the parlial or complete denial of access on the grounds that the content may be illcgal, exploited for criminal 
ends, or potentially harmful. Such denial may be necessary 10 prolect end-uscrs (such as children). potcntial 
victims, or even content intermediaries sllch as Inlernet scrvice providers." Id. ~ I. 
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created by the widely used effects-based jurisdiction. Part III discusses the three2 
main alternatives for conferring jurisdiction over Internet content and regulating 
access: (1) effects-based jurisdiction, (2) target-based jurisdiction, and (3) private 
industry filtering. Finally, Part III also analyzes how well each method balances 
governmental law enforcement interests against the interests of individual free 
speech and explains why the WGIG and the WSIS must adopt private industry 
filtering as the preferred method for dealing with Internet jurisdiction. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The World Summit on the Information Society is "held under the high 
patronage of the UN Secretary-General, with [the International 
Telecommunication Union (lTU)) taking the lead role in preparations."3 The 
WSIS convened because "world leaders decided that a global vision and a global 
dialogue were needed to build the framework of an all-inclusive and equitable 
Information Society."-I 
2 In reality, there arc more than three alternatives to addres, the problem of Internet jurisdiction. For 
example, it has been proposed that an international organization should be created which would regulate the 
Internet. SI!I! John Zarocostas, UN. Cmlll) Sl!eks COlllrol o/llllallel, C()~II'IIII,R CRI~lIc RlcSlcARlll Clto:HR, Nov. 
IS, 2003, ({I http://www.crime-research.org/news/2003111/MessIX02.html( last vi,ited Mar, X, 20()S). However, 
the viability of this solution is questionablc as it tilces strong opposition trom some free-market nations. 1d. 
Additionally, due to ··the broad differences in culture and law. it is extremely ditlieult to come to an objective 
judgment on whether some content is acceptable or unlawful." Working Group on Internet Governance. ISSIII! 
Pi/PO; .I'llI'm note I. at I. Finally, it is not clear if such an organiEation would e\entually address the issue of 
speech or stick to areas of relative universal agreement such as fraud. Therefore, while other solutions exist, 
only the three solutions, which, in the opinion of the author, arc most probable. will be discu"ed. 
3 International Telecommunication Union, B({ckgrolll/(1 ({lid Origills of Iii I! SlIlIIlIlil. ({I http://www. 
itu.int/wsis/basic/baekgrountl.html (last visited Mar. 19, 200S), 
4 International Telecommunication Union. Fre'!lIelll!I' I"ked Qlleslioll,l' o,! Will' il Iilere ({ 1f'(II'ld 
SlIlIUllit olllile III/i)J'Jllillioll S()Cil!tl':), ({I http: /\\'ww.itu.inl!wsis/basic/faqs.asp tlast visited Mar. 19. 20()S). 
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The WSIS consists of two chronological phases; the first was completed 
in Geneva during December, 2003.5 As part of the first phase, the WSIS requested 
the establishment of a Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG)J' The 
WG IG 's duty is "to investigate and make proposals for action ... on governance 
of the Internet," which will be considered in the second phase of the WSIS set to 
take place November 16-18, 2005 in Tunisia.7 
Two issues identified by the WGIG thus far, unlawful content and accesS 
protection,X are currently on the WSIS agenda. Thus, the WGIG and the WSIS 
provide the perfect opportunity to address and deal with global Internet 
jurisdiction problems and more specifically, the problems arising from effeets-
based jurisdiction. The opportunity is timely, as efTects-based jurisdiction is 
quickly becoming the primary method employed for determining proper 
jurisdiction.9 
EfTects-based jurisdiction allows for exercise of jurisdiction whenever 
one element of a crime is committed in the forum state. IO It is not necessary that 
all of the clements be committed in one forum. I I Under the effects-based 
5 International Telecommunication Union, Background, sl/pra note 3. 
6 World SUlllmit on the Ini(mnation Society. Dec/llmtiol1 0/ Pril1C1j)/i's. Buildil1g thi' Ill/imlllltioll 
SOCii'tL A C/o/w/ C//(///i'llge ill thi' Xi'll' ;\1i//elll1iulII. ('.N. Doc. WSIS-03/GENEVAi[)OC4-E (Dec. 12,2(03), 
a\'(Ji/ah/e at http://www.itu.intiwsisidocs/geneva/ofticial/dop.html(iast visited Apr. 26, 20(5). 
7 1<1.: International Telecomlllunication Union, Backgrolilld . .I'llI'm note 3. 
X Si'i' Working Group on Internet GO\ ernance. ISSlIi' Paper . .I'llI'm note I. 
9 Michael Geist. The Lcga/llllj)/ic(/ti,)//s o//hi' )illlOo.' Il1c. NII~i /"!1!lIlOm/,,'!ia /Jisl'lI/i'.· AI1 Il1ter"ic)\' 
"'ith Pro/i>,I'sor Micjllli!/ (/i'ist . .II ilns(,()~I.'Jf r. Jan. IX. 20(l!. lit http://www.juriscolll.nctieniunildoc/yahoo/geis(. 
htllli (bst visited April 26.20(5) I hereinafter Geist. Na~i ,Ifelllomhi/ia Oisplite I (interviews with Michael Geist 
organized by Lionel Thoumyre). 
I () Ray August, /lIti'rl/atio//al erher-jurisdictioll . .1 COllljJaratil'c Allalrsis, 39 A~d. Bus. L.J. 531, 
536 (2002). 
II !d. at 537. 
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analysis, a court has jurisdiction when that jurisdiction feels the negative effects 
or harm from the action. 
Various cases use an effects-based analysis to assert jurisdiction over 
Internet related content. 12 In particular, the United States uses this analysis to 
assert jurisdiction over foreign entities in cases involving fraud and child pornog-
raphy.1J These cases go unnoticed because censorship of child pornography and 
fraud are areas of near universal agreement. 14 However, the story is quite 
different when courts usc effects-based analysis to assert jurisdiction to censor 
content that does not enjoy similar universal agreement. International attempts to 
regulatc Internet content and online commerce will suffer from the contradictory 
standards and conflicting judicial rulings of diverse international jurisdictions. 
Additionally, Internet content creators may face criminal charges in foreign 
nations even though the offending content is legal in their own country.15 
Accordingly, content providers, fearing lawsuits, will refrain from posting 
content on the Internet despite being legally sanctioned or protected in their 
localities. Consequently, effects-based jurisdiction schemes threaten to restrain e-
commerce and ultimately chill free spccch. This chilling effect will be illustrated 
more fully by analyzing the effects-based jurisdiction utilized in the French case 
UEJF and Licra v. Yahoo! Il1c. and Yahoo France (Yahoo!).'!' 
121d.at5373S . 
. 13 Mathe\\ Fagin, Comlllent, /?cgu/o{ill,!!, 5})('('('1I lcros,\ Bordcn, Technology \'s. ""uc.\, C) rV11(,11. 
TLL[(()~l~t. & nllt. L. REV. 395.449 (2003). 
14 1£1. 
15 Working Group on Internct Governance, Issll~ P"I'~r. \1I/,m notc I, at I. 
16 LJEJF ct L1CRA v. Yahoo' Inc. ct Yahoo Francc, TG.1. Paris, May 22, 20()(), N° RG: 00/05308, 
obs. C'.Bcnsoal11 & lGol11c/, tralls/a/ioll ami/ah/!! a/ hltp:!/\\ww.juriscol11.nct/txLjurislrictiiyauctions2000052 
2.htl11 (last visitcd Apr. 2620(5). 
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III. TIIREE ALTERNATIVE METHODS 
A. Effects-hased Jltrisdiction 
The French case UEJF and Licra 1'. Yahoo! Inc. and Yahoo France 
effectively illustrates thc problems inherent in effects-based jurisdiction schemes. 
Yahoo.' demonstrates how an etTccts-based analysis unduly grants foreign courts 
jurisdiction over viliually all Intemet content. Moreover, it illustrates how wide-
sweeping jurisdiction creates contlicts in determining what is legal to post on 
intemationally accessible Internet sites. 
In Yahoo!. a French court found Yahoo! Inc. guilty of violating French 
law that prohibits the display of Nazi memorabilia. 17 Although Yahoo! Inc. 
clearly had no intention of violating French law and the Nazi memorahilia 
represented a marginal portion of the content available on its broadly inclusive 
auction site, in May 2000, the French judge deemed French COUlts as competent 
to preside over the dispute because Intemet surfers in France suffered damage. lx 
The French Interim COUli afTirmed the decision on similar grounds. That court 
concluded that although Yahoo! 's auction site is generally directed at users in the 
United States, as evidenced by the terms of delivery, language, cUlTency, and 
methods of payment used, the sale of Nazi memorabilia could not be considered 
as directed only at U.S. consumers because it "may be of interest to any 
person."I'! Thus, according to the French Interim Court, the mere fact that harm 
17 !d. 
I X 'el. 
19 ULIF ct LlCRA v. Yahoo' Inc. ct Yahoo Franec, Tej.1. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, N° Rei: OO/0530S, 
obs. J .Ci0I11C7, Iralls/ali()// a\"ili/"hf£! al http://www.cdl.org,'spcccil'intcrnational/OO 1120yahoofrancc.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 5, 20(5). 
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was felt in France and the fact that Yahoo! Inc. had at least some ability to 
determine a user's origin were enough to grant the French court competent 
jurisdiction.20 
The French Interim Court's assertion of jurisdiction created a large 
public outcry,2l particularly in the United States. This outcry is rooted in the 
possibility that other countries will adopt the dangerous precedent set by the 
French Interim Court's decision to assert foreign jurisdiction in speech related 
cases that affect international commerce. 22 Opponents of effects-based 
jurisdiction stress that it will lead to "a jurisdictional morass, an overabundance 
of jurisdictional claims, and an undesirable increase in the cost of online 
publication. "23 
It is impOliant to note that the French case did not regulate the sale of 
Nazi items, which more traditional methods would typically regulate. Rather, the 
Yuhoo! ruling focused specifically on the mere display of Nazi memorabilia. 24 If 
other countrics adopt the Yahoo! court's rationale, any country with Internet 
access will assert jurisdiction over all content on the I nternet because potentially 
objectionable material may have been displayed in that country.2S This will 
inevitably lead to contradictory standards and judicial rulings, as each country 
attempts to regulate Internct content regardless of its origin or directed 
20 Id. 
2l Geisi. ,vll~i i'vtenlOmhilia /)il/,II/e. SlIl}m no Ie 9. 
22/d. 
23 Fugin •. Ill!'/"({ note 13. al 407. 
24 BCIl Lauric, All Expert\- Ap%gr. AI'ACm-ssL.ol{(;, Nov. 21, 20()O. III http: Iwww.apache-ssl.org/ 
apology.hlml (Iasl visiled Mar. 7, 2(05). 
25 Fagin, slIpra nole 13, al 410 II. 
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audience. 2(' In fact, a U.S. District court has already refused to enforce the French 
decision in the U.S.,n legitimizing critics' fears that inconsistent rulings will 
provide additional compliancc costs and impact contcnt providcrs' cost-benefit 
analyses. 
The logical extension of the Yahoo.' rationale is that every intemct 
publishing entity will be forced to implement and "maintain a huge matrix of 
pages versus jurisdictions to see who can and can't sec what."2x The cost and 
effort seem pointless or frivolous when one considers the case with which 
filtering technology can protect various Intemet users.2,! Nevertheless, even if 
filtering technology is effective, how will online content providers know whether 
they are violating laws in countries all over the world? Will corporations be 
required to hire lawyers in each nation to inspect every piece of questionable 
material? Conversely, must entities refrain from publishing material that is 
questionable by any stretch of the world's collective imagination? By using 
international content filtering,JO content providers may avoid potential liability 
and online content censorship, but such a course will aggregate into a global 
chilling effect on speech and online commerce. 
Support for the fear of a chilling effect can be found in Yahoo! 's response 
to the French decision and CompuServe's response to a similar situation 
26 Rinat Hadas. Case COll1ll1cnt. IlIleriloliollollllll'rIIl'I.llIrisiliclio/l." Whose Lml' is Righ(). 15 I'u . 
.I. IVI'I L. 299. 307 (2002). 
27 Yahoo'. Inc. \. LICRA. 169 F. Slirp. 2d IIHI (N.D. Cal. 2(01). 
28 Lauric. slIpra note 24. 
29 Iii. 
30 Fagin . .1'11,,,.0 note 13. at 414 15. 
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involving Germany in 1995.31 In both cases, the Internet service provider blocked 
the offensive content rather than spend resources implementing centralized, 
nation-specific filters. 32 Extraterritorial restriction of speech, conflicting laws, 
and increased costs of Internet publication all bolster the fears and criticisms of 
effects-based jurisdiction." 
Some, however, argue that fears of ctTects-based jurisdiction are 
unfounded. For example, Jaek Goldsmith, professor of law at the University of 
Chicago Law School, posits that cyberspace transactions do not truly differ from 
traditional transnational transactions and can be similarly regulated.l~ He 
provides several examples of non-Internet related cases in which laws arc applied 
extraterritorially with negative spillover effects.]) He points out that while these 
spillover effects are the central problem of effect-based jurisdiction, they are 
inevitable because the social and economic cost of eliminating them is too highY, 
Therefore, the spillover effects of extraterritorial application of other countries' 
31 CompuScrvc was thrcatencd with a lawsuit in Deccmber 1995 Illr allowing (ierman CompuScrvc 
subscribers to access discussion groups containing pornographic materials in violation of German law. In 
rcsponse, CompuServe unilaterally blocked access to the discussion groups, effectively blocking the groups for 
all subscribcrs world-wide. Eventually, CompuServe again allowed acce" atlcr making filtering technology 
available to their (Jerman suhscribcrs. However. the German prosecutor notified COlllpuScrvc that ~lIch efforts 
were still not in cOlllpliance with (iennan laws. Felix SOIll III , head of COlllpuServe Dcutschland was 
subsequently given a suspendcd t\Hl year sentence j(,r violalion of (jerman law. The conviction was then 
revcrsed a ycar latcr by a superior court. 5;~i! Jack L. (;oldsmilh, Aglliml ('d)~/"({//{{rc"I', (,5 U, CIII, L. REV, 
1199, 1224 .. 25 (199g): Associated Press. ('OIl/PIISI.'!"l'e Et-O!liei"I,~ 1'0,.,,-( 'lise ( 'o/ll'ielioll Ri!l'ersul (No\', 17, 
1999), IImiiahle III http://www.cybcr-rights,org/isps/sollllll-dcc,hlill (last visited Apr. 26, 2()05) 1 hcreinatlcr 
Associated Press, COII/IJ/lS~n'e I, 
32 Goldsmith, I'llI'm note 31. at 1224; Marc Le Mcnestrel ct aI., 1111",.,,('/ H-elhics ill COlljl"fJIIlalioll 
lI'ilh (1/1 ActiJ'isls ',lgelldll: },i/W(),' Oil Trilll, al http;/lwww,econ,upfcsidceholl1e/what/wpapersiposlscripls:577, 
pdf (Nov, 200 I) (last visitcd Apr. 26. 2(05) 
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35 Id,atI21112. 
36 /", at 1212. 
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laws do not originate from applying national law to internationally available 
Internet sitesY The problems of extraterritorial jurisdiction and compliance 
existed previously, and the existing tools of modern conflict laws and tech-nology 
deal with them as ably as they wi II with the spi lIover efTects of extraterritorial 
Internet regulation.:lX Professor Goldsmith docs not mean to say that laws will not 
change, but rather, countries can regulate Internet publication and commerce just 
as they regulate transnational transactions.:1'! 
One important fact supports Goldsmith's argument: while a country may 
theoretically impose its laws on the world, practically speaking, enforcement of 
those laws depends on the country's ability to implement them internationally.40 
A country's power to enforce its laws is tied to its ability to attach any assets the 
accused entity may maintain in the country.41 However, most Internet users and 
online publishers do not maintain assets abroad:'" Thus, it seems that fears of 
freedom of speech restraints imposed by a ruling in a foreign court have little to 
no practical basis. 4 :1 Foreign rulings will primarily alTect multinational corpora-
tions that maintain assets in the regulating jurisdiction.44 Just as multinational 
corporations already accept liability in brick and mOliar transactions they will 
start to include liability costs associated with associated click and mortar 
37 Ill. 
3S Iii. at 1213. 
39 Iii. at 120001. 1213. 
40 Iii. at 121 (, 17. 
41 Iii. 
42 Id. at 1217. 
-13 Sel! it!. 
44 Id. 
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enterprises in cost-benefit analyses prior to investing significant assets in foreign 
jurisdictions.45 
The Yahoo! case reinforces and enhances Goldsmith's reasoning. Due to 
the subsequent U.S. District Court case, Yahoo! Inc. did not implement the 
filtering mandated by the French court. 46 Although they removed the 
objectionable material,47 it is not likely that Yahoo! Inc. will implement the 
filtering in the near future unless they acquire direct assets in France that could 
be used to enforce the French ruling.4x In summary, Goldsmith concludes that 
extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction is unlikely to stifle individual or corporate 
online speech.49 
Goldsmith's enforceability analysis is logical and practical for 
companies. However, according to the aftermath of both the Yahoo! and 
CompuServe cases, it is unlikely that individuals and companies will remain 
unatTected by court rulings. In both cases the content found on these companies' 
servers was not placed there by the company, but by individual users. Goldsmith 
briefly mentions the possibility of indirect effects on users who arc dependent on 
service providers with a presence in the regulating jurisdiction, but he does not 
give it much consideration.51) In the Yahoo! case, individuals sold Nazi memora-
45 Fagin, supm note 13. at 417 I X (summarizing (ioldsmith, supm note 31 ). 
46 See Yahoo', Inc. v. LlCRA, 169 F. Supp. 2d II X I (N .D. Cal. 200 I); Hadas, supm note 26, at 
307 OX. 
47 The Associated Press & Reuters, 1,i/lOo' Na::i AucliIJII Hall Weicollled (Jan. 3, 200 I), ami/ahle a/ 
htlp:llarchivcs.ellll.coIl1/200 I IWOR 1.D/cllropC/O I dB/nel.hate/ (last visited Apr. 26. 200,). 
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bilia on Yahoo's auction website."1 In CompuServe, individual users posted 
information to discussion groupS.S2 Thus, the Internet Service Provider and the 
individual content provider were arguably distinct entities. Both companies 
currently state in their terms of service that the individual users will be respon-
sible for any unlawful information posted on the Internet through their service.53 
Despite such attempts to ascribe liability for content away from the company, 
Yahoo! Inc. specifically changed its user agreement to prohibit Nazi memorabilia 
as a result of the French Yahoo! case. 54 Additionally, at the time of the French 
Yahoo.' case, Yahoo! Inc.'s terms of service stipulated that the site was governed 
by the laws of the United States. 55 However, in light of the Yahoo! case, this type 
of service agreement's terms and choice of law provisions do not seem to deter 
courts from exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over content providers. 56 
Ultimately, these agreements and provisions otTer little protection to content 
providers who are forced to remove objectionable material f1'om their online 
portals for fear of lawsuits and possible fines. 
Although individual content creators may be immune to assertions of 
foreign jurisdiction as Goldsmith argues, online content and portal providers are 
restrained through the assertion of jurisdiction over service providers. Those 
51 Le MencstreL slIlJra note 32. ~ I J. 
52 Associated Press. (·o/IIIJlISen'<,. slIpra note 31. 
53 Yahoo'. Terms of Sen'ice. al'ailah/" ,II http://docs.yahoo.comlint(1'tcrms! (last visited Mar. 7. 
2()05): COlllpllScrvc. Tams of ese. al'ai/ah/" al hilI': I\vehccntcrs.colllpllscrvc.cOIl1/COll1pllScrvcltnCIlli'tcnns . 
.isp (last visited Mar. 7. 20(J)). 
54 Fagin. slIpra note 13. at 424 25. 
55 Michael A. Geist. /.I Thel'e a Thel'e Thel'e:' To\l'{/I'{/ Greal('/' Cer/aill/)' fiJI' IIl/e/'l1e/.Iurisdictioll. 16 
Bt:Rnl!-Y n.ll!. L.J. 1345. 1350 (2(JOI) I hereinafter Cicisl. Is There ({ There Ther,,:'I. 
56 Id. at 14()(1 
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placing lawsuits need not go after individuals posting objectionable content. 
There is greater incentive to go after the companies or web pOl1als that provide 
access to the information. If all major companies restrict or block objectionable 
material for fear of foreign lawsuits, individual expression of thought and opinion 
will be severely restrained as will the companies' ability to successfully operate 
online publication services. Online services like discussion boards, web hosting 
services, or auctions on sites such as Yahoo!, MSN, AOL, CompuServe, Amazon, 
and eBay will no longer be able to provide forums for individual expression and 
free speechY Individuals will be left to maintain their own web server, find a 
lesser known company unafraid of litigation, or find a company willing to 
publish such information for a fcc. 
If there is a demand or desire for such information, it will always be 
found on the Internet.5x However, part of the value in serviccs like Yahoo! or 
eBay is that they arc inexpensive, well known, and frcquently visited. 
Considering the immense size of the Internet and thc innumerable websites 
available, the greatest utility that services like eBay or Yahoo! otTer is the large 
number of visitors that are likely to sec and have ready access to the information. 
Thus, limiting the comprehensive scope of the services and content provided by 
these well-known companies will stifle the free flow of information and 
expressIon. 
- 57 In addition to the cases against Yahoo' Inc. and CompuServe, suits have been threatened against 
eBay.com. Amazon.com. and Barnesandnoblc.com t(lr the sale ofNa7i and KKK items as well as Hitler's Meill 
KUlllp/. These threats have caused these retailers to cither block or restrict the sale of such items despite their 
legality in the United States. Le Menestrcl, SlI/J}'(/ note 32, ~ 1.1. 5'-ee a/so Fagin, slIl'ra note 13, at 425 n.92; 
Steve Kettmann, //e II'JII'I Joill ,111J(COII \ 'Kallll'/", WIf{I[).l'()~I, Dec. 2, 1999, al 
hllp:llwww.wired.comillcwsiprillt. 0, t 294,32~35,()().htllll (last visilcd Apr. 2(', 2()()5). 
5~ Geist, !Va~i lv/el/lOrahi/ia Di,lp"/e, IIIl'ra note 9. 
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The greater the number of countries that use efTects-based jurisdiction, 
the greater the chilling ctTect on speech. Even though individuals may escape 
intemationallitigation, the restrictions placed on companies and web servers will 
still inhibit freedom of expression. Therefore, for the sake of protecting free 
expression and transnational commerce, the WGIG and the WSIS must take steps 
to curb the use of effects-based jurisdiction. 
B. Twget-hased .Jurisdictiol1 
Target-based jurisdiction is one possible alternative that seeks to avoid 
the negative aspccts of ctTects-based analysis. 59 A target-bascd analysis attempts 
to identify the intent ofthc online content provider by considering the actions and 
efforts of content providers to target or not target a specific forum or audience. 6o 
This type of analysis provides predictability and certainty for online publishers 
and helps eliminate the spillover ctTects of an effects-based analysis as publishers 
may avoid jurisdictions where they wish to avoid court actions.(,1 
Despite its benefits, target-based analysis is not likely to replace ctTects-
based analysis. COUlis are reluctant to use this analysis if local harm would go 
uncorrected when servers and websites unintended for that locality are 
immunized under target-bascd analyscs. 62 Thcreforc, many courts arc likely to 
59 Geist, Is ThC're II Thae TltC'/"C':', SIII}m note 55. at 13g0 X I. 
hO Id. at 13g0. 
61 Id. at 1380 g I. 
62 Fagin, .I'llI'm note 13, at 436. 
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continue employing the wider reaching effects-based analysis. 63 In the case of 
speech and censorship, laws vary greatly from country to country. 
In order for the target-based analysis to work, there must be a standard 
for determining when a publisher is targeting a forum. 64 A targeted relationship 
that subjects the individual or company to a foreign country's jurisdiction should 
require more certainty than an dTects-based analysis.6' Whatever the standard is, 
it must be teehnologieally neutral.(,6 For example, it may be appropriate today to 
consider the language and currency used on a particular website when 
determining which jurisdictions the content creator has targeted. 67 However, 
emerging technologies allow for real-time language and currency conversion and 
limit the value of such criteria for accurate target determination.IlK The targeting 
standard must also be content neutral to avoid favoring any interest group over 
another (e.g. buyers over sellers or consumers over manufacturers). 6<) 
One appropriate criterion for determining when a publisher is targeting a 
forum is foreseeability.711 This criterion would depend upon the following factors: 
contracts, technology, and actual or implied knowledge.7 1 Individually, none of 




64 Cieist, Is There (I Then' There:), slll,m note 55. at 13X4. 
65 See iii. 
66 /<1. 
67 !d. at 1384 85. 
68 1d. 
69 It!. at 1385. 
70 It!. 
7IM 
72 !d. at 1386. 
Issue Transnational Internet Censorship 
First, contracts provide evidence of foreseeability as to jurisdiction; and 
the value of contract forum selection clauses depends on the terms of the contract 
as well as the manner in which the parties consent to the contrac1.13 Based on U.S. 
court decisions, if the user is required to assent to the terms and conditions using 
clickable icons such as 'I agree' icons, courts are more likely to enforce these 
mutually agreed upon termsJl Courts arc less likely to enforce non-consensual 
agreements. Thus, if the terms and conditions arc merely contained on a separate 
page that the user can choose to read or not, the COUlt may find no assent between 
the parties. 75 
Perhaps more important than the way in which parties assent to forum 
selection clauses is the reasonableness of the contract terms. Courts will 
generally weigh the forum selection clause in light of the reasonableness of the 
clause, the ties to the selected forum, and the laws of the selected forum. Such 
considerations are taken to prevent a race-to-the-bottom effect where companies 
try to contract into the most favorable jurisdiction despite other eonsiderations.?6 
Incidentally, while the presence of a contract forum selection clause may 
enhance the ability of a court to determine the foreseeability of a targeted 
audience, the absence of such a clause may also allow the courts to deduce the 
website's intended users. Rather than a standard contract, some web sites provide 
uscrs with the opportunity to key in his or her jurisdiction, which information 
determines whether or not the website wi II allow the L1ser access to its site.?7 This 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 13X7. 
75 1£1. 
76ld.atl391 
77 Id. at 1391 92. 
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type of subjective access granting based on location proves the online provider's 
intent to target a particular audience and restrict access in particular jurisdic-
tions.7x This process makes the web provider's intent more apparent; however, 
when prescribing jurisdiction, courts will still consider the case with which users 
can circumvent such provisions in order to gain access to the site.79 
The second factor that may determine whether or not a web provider has 
foreseeably targeted a particular jurisdiction is technology. As new technologies 
continue to emerge, websites have thc ability to detcrmine the user's geographic 
location with increasing aceuraey.xo Once the provider identifies the user's 
geographic location, the website can alter or prevent the user's access in order to 
avoid that particular jurisdiction. Accordingly, modcrn technology can construc-
tively help courts to determine the content creator's intent to target or avoid a 
particular jurisdiction. 
For example, some of these technologies can determine the user's 
location by focusing on the uscr's IP (internct Protocol) addrcss. Various propri-
ctary products arc produccd to determinc a uscr's location, many of which boast 
up to 99% accuracy.XI Alternatively, other new tcchnologies collcct location 
information voluntarily from uscrs, typically through attributc cCltificatcs and 
credit card information. X2 
7X 1<1. at 1391. 
79 1<1. at 1392. 
80 SI.'I.' id. at 1393. 
81 1£1. at 1397. 
82 1d. at 1398 99. An attribute certiticalc is a digitally signed certiiicate that presenh information 
about a particular user, such as geographic location, without providing the user's identity. The digitally signed 
certiticates also prove ditlicult fiJr other Internet users to i',rge. Id. 
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As online entities improve upon existing technologies and continue to 
develop new technologies, they will increase their accuracy in determining a 
user's location. Consequently, they will possess increased capabilities to allow, 
block, or change the content viewed by certain users, based upon the user's 
specific jurisdiction. When analyzing technology as a factor in the foreseeability 
of online providers' liability in particular jurisdictions, courts should not require 
online entities to use specific methods to identify a user's location but should 
merely consider the technologies available and used at the time. x3 
The final factor of the foreseeability test in target-based jurisdiction is 
actual or implied knowlcdge. x4 Actual knowledge of a user's location can be 
determined through geographic location technology, shipment of goods, receipt 
of contact emails, etc. X:; COUlis have typically attributed implied knowledge to 
defendants in defamation, tort, libe!, and illegal gambling cases where the 
offending party should have been aware of the cause of his or her actions in the 
targeted jurisdictions. X(, The actual or implied knowledge factor prevents 
companies from hiding behind contract clauses and technological screening 
initiatives when in fact they knew or should have known that users from a 
particular jurisdiction accessed their site. X7 
If target-based analyses employ foreseeability tests that include weighing 
the three factors discllssed ahove, they would effectively allow online entities to 
R3 Iii. at 1401. 
X4 Id. at 140~. 
R5 Iii. at \397. 1403. 
R(' Id. at 1402. 
X7 Iii. 
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predict which courts may prescribe jurisdietion over them. xx This in turn would 
allow them to avoid areas that they are unprepared or unwilling to enter. X9 It 
would remedy the costly speech-chilling and commerce inhibiting results of 
effects-based jurisdiction as online entities operating under a target-based regime 
would know of and have the ability to control which courts would have 
jurisdiction over them. 
However, as stated above, countries are unlikely to adopt this method if 
they need to rely on foreign cOUlis to correct the harm. Until a significant number 
of countries articulate and acccpt a standard test, each country will havc its own 
mcthod of determining when an online provider has targeted a particular forum, 
making it difficult to realize the benefits of the target-based approach. 
Essentially, this creates the same problems already evident in an effects-based 
jurisdiction because jurisdictional standards are only predictable if the targeting 
tests are standardized internationally. Therefore, in order for the WSIS to 
effectively implement this method, it must accomplish the overwhelming task of 
both articulating an acceptable and reliable standard ([lid convincing nations to 
forego exercising jurisdiction, even in cases where perceived and actual harms go 
uncon·ected. 
C. Private Illdllstl), Filtering 
Another method of regulating Internet speech and commerce without 
unforeseen and unwanted extraterritorial effects is private industry filtering. 
300 
~~ !d. at 1404. 
89 1<1. 
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According to this mcthod, countries require Internet Service Providers (ISPs) or 
users to install software to filter content deemed illegal or offensive by that 
country.90 This approach has three major advantages over the previous two 
methods. 
First, it gives each country the ability to regulate speech according to its 
own standards without the need to enforce extratelTitorial jurisdiction over 
foreign ISPs.91 Filtering information at the national level allows governments to 
control what users view within their borders without concern for what ISPs post 
in other countries. Therefore, individuals can view information according to the 
speech laws of their respective country and online entities can publish without the 
fear of extratelTitorial spillovers because each nation will only enforce its own 
laws rather than attempting to impose borders on Internet speech and commerce. 
Second, filtering gives each country greater control over the enforcement 
of its laws.9~ Rather than issuing potentially unenforceable decisions, as in the 
Yahoo! case, countries could enforce their decisions by threatening to blacklist 
the offending foreign company.'!) The threatened company could then evaluate its 
economic interest within that country and decide whether or not to comply with 
that particular country's mandate.94 Regardless of whether the ISP values access 
to that country and complies or decides to continue its regular activities and 
forego access, the government will remove the offensive and illegal information. 
90 See Fagin. slIl'm note 13. at 451. 
91 Id. 
92 SI''' id. at 451 
93 See it!. at 451 52. 
94 Sell id. at 452 53. 
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Third, private industry filtering docs not significantly increase the cost of 
online publication. Rather than placing the economic burden of maintaining "a 
huge matrix of pages versus jurisdictions"'») for each online content provider, 
local ISPs would be responsible for filtering according to its country's laws and 
could spread the expense among local subscribers. 
Private industry filtering is a logical answer to online jurisdictional 
problems; however, certain negative effects may prevent implementation. First, 
the economic costs may be greater than originally thought. The threat of world-
wide liability may cause global providers, such as America Online (AOL), to pull 
out of regions rather than comply with filtering requirements.% Second, many 
countries have laws that limit the liability of ISPs.')7 In these countries, courts do 
not perceive ISPs as content providers but as conduits for access to the Intemet.9~ 
These countries would fear restricting access to the Internet if such a plan would 
impose financial and technical liability on local ISPs.')<) 
One final negative effect of required filtering by ISPs is the potentially 
abusive power it lends to governments, opening the doors for repression of 
speech, as in China or Libya. loo Critics fear that such an increase in governmental 
power to control content will create a society akin to that of George Orwell's 'Big 
95 See Lauric, slIpm note 24. 
96 Stevc Kcttll1Hnn, //Il()lha lIaie Sile Trial ill Fmllce, WlRlll NI \\'S. June 29, 2001, al http://www. 
wircd.coll1/ncws/politics /O,12X3,4490X,OO.htll1l (last visited Apr.26, 2(05). 
97 Fagin, supm note 13, at 453. 
9S Id. 
99 Iii. 
100 Kercll1 Batir, Regulalillg I/ale Speech Oil Ihe IIl/('I'llel: L 'llililfera/islII \' MullilulcralislI/, 
Techll/(Iue \' L£I\I', ul http:' inct-tr.org.tr'inctconfX"1I111111l.'77.puf (Ia,t vi,itcu Mar. 9, 2(05). 
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Brother' novc\.11I1 This fear appears to stem from the past acts of speech-
repressive govemments, such as China, where authorities jail individuals for 
posting pro-democracy statements on the Intemet, IO~ or Iran whcre police 
arrested 70 schoolchildren for using the Internet to alTange dates.l<n Rather than 
trusting governments to refrain from abusing this power, critics of private 
industry filtering prefer altemative censorship methods. 
Despite the criticisms outlined above, private industry filtering is the best 
of the three alternatives discussed in this article. Although some ISPs may choose 
to pull out of a rcgion rather than comply with a country's monitoring and 
filtering laws, a private filtering regime can reduce these companies' concerns 
about high economic costs by limiting their liability through other legal means. 
ISP liability, for example, could be limited to allow only governmental agencies 
to take legal action against them for failure to make a reasonable and good faith 
effort to comply with filtering laws. lo4 Although filtering compliance costs may 
be high for ISPs, the cost to content providers such as Yahoo! Inc. are similarly 
high. ISPs actually have the advantage over content providers because they have 
the ability to spread compliance costs among local subscribers; whereas content 
101 Id. 
102 See Reporters Without Borders. The IlIlemel Cllder SI/I'\'ei/lallce: Ohslacll's 10 III(' Free F/Oll' of 
Ill/orll/alioll Oillill(" 31 (2003). (II hllp:/:\v\\'W.rsf./rilMCi/pdt;'doc-223(1.pdf (\ast visited Mar. 9. 20(3). 
103 Id. at 66. 
104 Howcvcr. it should be understood Ihat ISPs should not be required to achievc IO()'!;., tiltration 
since that is not a current technological possibility. Lauric. slIl'ra note 24; see Andy McCue. hi/lOo ('o/lSidas 
l\i('\1' 11'1/-Id Order. \~I'NH.()~1. Nov. 30. 2000. al http://www.vnullel.eom/analysisIlI14RR6 (last visited 
Apr.26. 200S). It is also important to remembcr that perfect filtration was not a requirement in }'i/U)(!.'. UE.lF et 
LlCRA v. Yahoo I Inc. et Yahoo Francc. TG.1. Paris. May 22. 2000. N° RG: OO!OS308. obs. C. Bcnsoall1 & .I. 
Gomcz. Irallslalioll al'ai/ahle (/1 hllp: i\\'ww,iuriscolll.nct,txUjurisfr, cti:yauctions20000522. htm (last visitcd 
Apr. 26. 2(05). 
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providers rely solely on advertising revenues which are dependent upon global 
access and breadth of content. lOS 
The second negative effect discussed above, that many countries 
currently restrict ISP liability, may also have a solution if ISPs ean filter illegal 
material while still complying with the applicable domestic legislation. The 
European Union Directive on Electronic Commerce provides an example of how 
this type of restriction may present a problem to private industry filtering: 
"Member States are prevented from imposing a monitoring obligation on service 
providers only with respect to obligations ofa general nature."I06 On its facc, the 
EU Directive appears to prohibit all blanket monitoring obligations, such as 
requiring local ISPs to filter all illegal material. However, the EU Directive does 
not affect specific monitoring cases: "orders by national authorities in accordance 
with national legislation," or the requirement that service providers exercise care 
in detecting and preventing illegal activities on services hosted by the provider. 107 
It follows that ISPs could plausibly install filtering software and block specific 
sites made illegal through legislation as they come to the ISP's attention without 
violating the Directive. Thus, the WSIS presents an opportunity for the world to 
cooperate in amending the Directive and other countries' legislation to permit this 
type of filtering. 
105 5(!!! Le Menestrel. Slip/"([ note 32, ~ 2.4. Analysts estimated that it would cost up to 25% of 
Yahoo I Inc. 's operating budget to comply with the French ruling. McCue, Sill'/"([ note 104. 
106 Parliament and Council Directive 2000/31/FC of X June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of 
Intormation Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market ("Directive on 
Electronic Commerce'), art. 47, 2000 OJ. (L 178) I. 
107 lei. at art. 48. 
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The most popular criticism of regulating ISP filtering on a national level 
IS the fear of oppressive censorship and undue governmental control, as 
explained above in reference to China and Iran. lox Private industry filtering is, 
however, only superficially similar to such information control regimes. 
Mandated filtering by ISPs docs not bestow new and extreme powers of control 
upon the government. France, for example, has already passed a statute making 
it illegal to sell or promote Nazi materials in Franee.lot) They have already 
enforced this statute in real world situations by banning the sale of Mein Kampf' 
in online bookstores. I 10 Requiring ISPs, rather than online entities, to filter the 
same content would extend regulation to the Internet without crossing the border 
into another nation's jurisdiction. Ultimately, as far as governmental objectives 
are concerned, there is little difference between mandating that Yahoo! Inc. filter 
Nazi articles from its site and mandating that French ISPs do the filtering. Indeed, 
requiring private industry filtering gives governments little censorship power 
beyond that which they already possess. It merely increases a country's ability to 
enforce its preexisting laws in this new and challenging medium. As illustrated 
in this article, many nations already attempt Internet content regulation. I II 
Standardized private industry filtering will make such attempts more effective 
while avoiding many negative cxtemal spillover effects. 
lOS Fagin . .I'II/'m nole 13. al 451. 
109 See UEJF el L1CRA v. Yahoo' Inc. cl Yahoo France . .I'II/,m no Ie 104 (finding Yahoo! Inc. 111 
violation of article R. 645-2 of the penal code. which makes il illegal 10 display Nazi memorabilia). 
II () S('(~ Le Menestrel. .I'll/Wit note 32. ~ 1.4. 
III See gU/('I'lII/,' Reporters Wilhout Borders . .I'llI'm note 102. 
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Australia's recent implementation of a private industry filtering system 
illustrates the effectiveness of private industry filtering,I12 The goals of the 
Australian legislation include providing "a means for addressing complaints 
about certain Internet content; and to restrict access to certain Internet content 
that is likely to cause ofTence to a reasonable adult; and to protect children from 
exposure to Internet content that is unsuitabJc for childrcn,"113 In order to 
accomplish thcse goals, the legislation gives the Australian Broadcasting 
Association (ABA) authority to investigate the availability of prohibited or 
potentially prohibited content and allows the ABA to investigate content 
complaints, I 14 If, after the investigation, the ABA determines that the content falls 
within one of the prohibited classifications, its next decision depends on whether 
the content is hosted in Australia or not. If the content is hosted on Internet severs 
in Australia, the ABA issues a final notice directing the host to discontinue 
hosting the otTensive content. I 15 If the content is hosted on a server site outside 
of Australia, the ABA mandates the ISP to follow industry codes or content 
filtering standards, II (, 
As compliance with ABA industry filtering standards is mandatory,117 the 
burden of censoring content rests soJcly on the service provider or content host, 
112 Broadcasting Serviccs Amcndmcnt (Onlinc Serviccs) Act, 1999, schcd. I (Aust!.), lIl'llilah/e al 
hllp:i/www.uscrs.bigpond.coll1/baker5ISJall1endcd.htll1l (last visited May 4, 20()S) (now included as schcd. 5 
of the Broadcasting Scn ices Act, 1992 (Austi.), (I\'lIilllhl!! III hllp/ .• /www.aba.gov.au/lcgislation/bsa. (Iasl visiled 
Mar. 9, 2()05 )). 
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leaving no obligation on the producers of content or those who access or upload 
content. IIX If an ISP or content host fails to comply, the ABA may issue a formal 
warning and apply to the Federal Court for a compliance order. I It) Compliant ISPs 
and hosts are free from civil liability for blocking content. 120 Regulatory strengths 
or weaknesses do not lie in the straightforward process set forth in the legislation, 
but in the industry filtering codes and standards. 
The Internet Industry Association (IIA) drafted the ABA's current 
code. 121 In drafting the code, the I1A attempted to balance industry interests with 
the govemment's interest in blocking offensive materiaL 12:> The code established 
by the IIA "does not impose allY requirement for ISPs to engage in universal 
blocking or content whieh the ABA deems prohibited."1:'1 It only "requires that 
ISPs provide certain classes of end users with tools by which means they can 
control the access of content into the home,"12-1 effectively placing content 
control in the end users' hands. Additionally, there is no requirement that the end 
user actually use the filtering product provided by the ISP.12) The code also 
fumishes ISPs with approved filters to satisfy the requirement of providing tools 
to the end user.121l In 2000, the list of approved filters rose to sixteen with over 
II X Id. al Pari I. ~ I( 2). 
119 Id. at Part 6. ~~ K4 X5. 
120 Id. at Part R. ~~ XX. 
121 Carolyn Penfold. TIll' Oll/ille Senic('\" Amelldmeill. IlIlernel COlllell1 Fi/lers, (/ild User 
I:'!lIliOll'('I'm('l1l. 7 N. L.R. ~~ X 9 (2000). (/milahfe al http: ·"pandora.nla.gov.au/parchive: 200 I IZ20() I-Mar-
3"wcb.nlr.com.auinlr, HTML'Articlcs/pent(lld2ipcnt(lld2.ht!11 (last visited Mar. 9, 200S). 
Inld.~9. 
123 Inliw,try Internet Association. 11..1 COlllell1 Regu/alioll ('ode of Praclice (\'ersiol1 7.2),(/\'(/i/([h/(' 
al http://www.iia.nct.au,contentcodc.html (last visitcd Mar. 9. 200S). 
124/d. 
125 Pentl.lld. sUl'm notc 121. ~ In. 
126 1£1. 
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one hundred more available on the market. In Although the study and criteria 
used to assess the filters placed on the list failed to evaluate the actual 
effectiveness of the different filters,'2x the market is likely to produce more 
effective filtering products than those currently approved by the ABA.124 
Based on the Australian legislation's original goal to restrict access to 
offensive content, the law appears ineffective because it lacks a mandatory 
filtering requirement for ISPs and the approved filters may possibly be less 
etTective than the commercially available tilters. However, the IIA's "industry 
facilitated user empowerment"1311 approach leaves the ultimate choice of 
censorship in the hands of the user rather than the government. Other countries 
may consider adopting this approach because it alleviates reservations regarding 
grants of governmental censorship power. 
D. Content Labeling 
Private industry filtering will be far more effective if implemented in 
combination with the Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS)'31 and a 
standardized content labeling vocabulary such as the one developed by the 
Internet Content Rating Association (ICRA). PICS provides a standard 




129 ld. * 51. 
130 Industry Internet Association. supra note 123. 
131 For 1110re details regarding Pies. visit http://www.w3.org/PICS/ (last visited Mar. 5, 20()S). 
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creating labels or labeling Internet content itself. 132 It merely provides a way for 
all PIeS-compliant filtering software to read the labels regardless of what 
program gencrated the labcl. Thc leRA works 111 harmony with thc PICS by 
providing an intcrnationally accepted voluntary rating system uS1l1g PICS 
labels.L13 The ICRA docs not rate sites, but rather provides a system for content 
creators to label their site with "an objective, descriptive label."IH 
The PICS system has the advantage of allowing each nation to determine 
via PICS labels and national law which sites ISPs must filter, all without affecting 
other nations' access to the material or restraining online speech and commerce. 
Additionally, the labels themselves are neutral and merely describe what the site 
contains. Unfortunately, few content creators apply labels on a voluntary basis, 
leaving many sites unlabeled and rendering national filtering schemes 
ineffective. The WGIG found that in practice, the ICRA software failed due to the 
lack of a "critical mass of sites labeling their content."I~S 
The ICRA and other label filtering software can be effective if world 
governments unify and agree upon labeling methods; and provide incentives for 
content creators to label their sites. For example, governments could eliminate 
content creator's liability in foreign jurisdictions if they have properly labeled 
132 Paul Resnick & Jallles Miller. PIes: IlIlerilel A('('ess COlllmis Wilholll CCllsorshil'. 39(10) 
COV1VI1''JICAIIO'JS 01 1111 ACM R7 (I 99h). <ll'IIiiah/c al http://\v\\'w.\\'3.org'PICS·iacwcv2.htll1 (last visited Mar. 
17.20(5). All content and IIlf(Jrlnation on the Internet can be "labeled" or identified in the broadcast stream to 
"rellect diverse viewpoints" and allow soli" arc to block content with specific labels. Iii. The Pies is 
"analogous to specifying where on a package a label should appear, and in what font it should be printed, 
without specifying vvhat it should say." Id. 
133 Internet Content Rating Association, .·!I/.\·"·C/'S 10 t-.:!Qs aholll ICR.!, FAQs 1.1,4.1, at 
http://www.icra.orgiElqiabouticrai (last visited Mar. 17, 200S). 
134 !d at FAG 4.2. 
135 Working (jroup on Internet Governance, ISSlle 1'''1'('1", SIlI'I'lI note I, ~ R. 
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their sites. If content creators fail to properly label their site, they would be 
subject to suit in any jurisdiction that has access to the information, as in an 
effects-based jurisdiction analysis. Another alternative that would help create the 
necessary critical mass of labeled sites is requiring proper labels prior to domain 
name registration. Private industry filtering, therefore, avoids the external costs 
of an effects-based analysis and can give each government greater control over 
unlawful sites. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The WGIG recognizes that "rtleaving things as they are creates 
uncertainty on the part of content providers."136 "[S]ome kind of best practice" is 
needed at the very least. \37 Each of the three methods discussed above have 
advantages and disadvantages. Of the three, private industry filtering combined 
with standardized content labeling provides the best alternative, enabling nations 
to enforce their laws on the Internet without extending the ctTects of those laws 
into other nations. Accordingly, the WGIG and WSIS would be wise to adopt the 
"best practice" of private industry filtering to deal with the uncertainty of 
extraterritorial Internet jurisdiction. 
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